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Modeling the Relationship between Expected Gain and
Expected Value
Eugene J. S. Won*

Rational choice theory holds that the alternative with largest expected utility in the choice set
should always be chosen. However, it is often observed that an alternative with the largest expected
utility is not always chosen while the choice task itself being avoided. Such a choice phenomenon
cannot be explained by the traditional expected utility maximization principle. The current study
posits shows that such a phenomenon can be attributed to the gap between the expected perceived
gain (or loss) and the expected perceived value. This study mathematically analyses the relationship
between the expectation of an alternative’s gains or losses over the reference point and its expected
value, when the perceived gains or losses follow continuous probability distributions. The proposed
expected value (EV) function can explain the effects of loss aversion and uncertainty on the
evaluation of an alternative based on the prospect theory value function. The proposed function
reveals why the expected gain of an alternative should exceed some positive threshold in order for
the alternative to be chosen. The model also explains why none of the two equally or similarly attractive
options is chosen when they are presented together, but either of them is chosen when presented
alone. The EV function and EG-EV curve can extract and visualize the core tenets of the prospect
theory more clearly than the value function itself.
Key words: prospect theory, loss aversion, value function, expected gain, expected value

function was proposed by Kahneman and Tversky

Ⅰ. Introduction

(1979) in their prospect theory. Field and experimental evidence supports the prospect theory
In contrast to the traditional utility function

value function whereby choices are best explained

based on the concept of fixed utility, the value

by assuming that carriers of value are not final
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assets, but gains and losses relative to a certain
reference point (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991;
Barberis et al., 2001). Prospect theory has been
proved to be a psychologically more accurate

Ⅱ. The Relationship between
Expected Gain and Expected
Value Based on a Piecewise
Linear Value Function

description of decision making, compared to the
expected utility theory (Tversky and Simonson,
1993). This study expands on the prospect theory

Let A={i, j,…} be the set of finite number of

value function by assuming that gains or losses

available alternatives, and   denote the value

are hardly perceived as deterministic but mostly

of alternative i, dependent on choice set A.

perceived as probabilistic in real choice situations.

Let’s assume the simplest functional form re-

If so, the value of a choice alternative will be

flecting loss aversion, which is a piecewise lin-

perceived as stochastic as well and people will

ear value function (Tversky and Kahneman,

have to utilize some representative index such

1991; Tversky and Simonson, 1993; Hardie,

as the expected value as a decision-making cri-

Johnson and Fader, 1994).

terion, just like the expected utility maximization
rule (von Neumann and Morgerstern, 1944; Arrow




   , if  ≥  , and

1951). This study theoretical investigates the




   , if   

(1)

relationship between the expectation of an alternative’s perceived gains or losses and the

where  denotes option i’s gain(if    ) or

expectation of its value. This study tries to ex-

loss(if    ) relative to the reference point

plicate the functional relationship between expected gain(EG) and expected value(EV) with
what is called the EV function and discuss its
implications. This study reveals that differentiating
between the concepts of EG and EV and analyzing the relationship between them can be
very useful in extracting the core implications
of prospect theory as to consumer choice, espe-

used for evaluating option i in set A. Parameters
 and  are the gain and loss parameters re-

spectively, and the inequality 0 <    (loss
aversion) is assumed to always hold.
Let’s further assume that  is a random
variable that follows a logistic distribution. The
expectation of  , or alternatively the expected

cially for the case of choice between equally or

gain(EG) of i is denoted as E  and the

similarity attraction alternatives.

standard deviation of  is denoted as  for
notational simplicity. The term, expected gain,
will be used for referring to expected loss as
well by its being negative. The probability den-
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sity function of  , f Ai  , can be expressed

If we assume a specific case where E    ,
    ,    , and    , the probability den-

as follows.

sity functions for  and  will be have such
shapes as shown in Figure 1.
Let E   denote the expectation of  ,
(2)

which will be alternatively called the expected

value(EV) of i. Then E  can be calculated



  also becomes a random variable. If we let

as follows.



g   denote the probability density function of


 , the g   can be derived from Equation (2).

for   ≥  , and

for     . (3)

(EV function)(4)

<Figure 1> The Probability Density Functions of  and  at E    ,    ,    , and   
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Let the ratio  be simply denoted as k,


an alternative is negative when its EG is pos-

whereby the magnitude of  reflects the de-

i.e., E   E  . In order for E  to be

gree of loss aversion. The other variables assumed to be fixed, E  is a monotonic increasing, concave function of E  . The EG-EV
curve in Figure 2 shows the functional relationship between E  and E  for a spe-

itive but smaller than a certain threshold value,
positive, E  should be greater than a certain
threshold represented as E  in the figure.
An option is perceived as attractive enough to
be chosen only when its expected gain is large
enough to overcome the people’s distaste for

cific case where    , k=2, and    . The

possible loss. Calculations based on the EV

dotted straight lines in the figure are the

function show that increased uncertainty about

asymptote of the curve.

gains or losses (  ) decreases E  . From

The EG-EV curve crosses the vertical axis
below the origin, which means that the EV of

Equation (4),

an option is negative when the option’s EG is
zero. People feel like they are losing out when
they are provided an option with the same
amounts of possible gains and losses, because
possible losses loom larger than possible gains.
The shape of the curve implies that the EV of
<Figure 2> The EG-EV Curve under the Assumption of a Piecewise Linear Value Function
(   ,    , k=2)
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(5)

Mathematica Software is used for the calcu-

including what is called the myopic loss aver-

lations throughout the article. Figure 3 shows

sion (Benartzi and Thaler 1995; Thaler et al.

that reduced uncertainty increases the attrac-

1997). Myopic loss aversion is a behavioral con-

tiveness of the option with a constant expected

cept proposed as an explanation for the equity

gain. Such a phenomenon is illustrated by an

premium puzzle, which is defined as the differ-

example proposed by Samuelson (1963). Samuelson

ence in returns between equities (stocks) and

once offered a colleague the following bet: flip

a risk-free asset such as treasury bills (Mehra and

a coin, heads you win $200 and tails you lose

Prescott 1985). Having a long-term perspective

$100. Samuelson reports that his colleague turned

often eliminates or diminishes high perceived

this bet down but said that he would be happy

uncertainty arisen from a myopic(short-term)

to take 100 such bets. He then proved that

perspective. Thus, an investor who is prepared

this pair of choices is irrational, because some-

to wait a long time before evaluating the out-

one should not be willing to play a bet many

come of the investment as a gain or loss will

times if he is not willing to play it just once.

find the risky asset (stocks) more attractive than

Based on the model proposed in this study,

another investor (equally loss aversive, but more

what the aggregation or the repetitions of the

myopic) who evaluates the outcome soon or

same bet does is not to change the expected

frequently (Thaler et al. 1997). Narrow framing,

gain of the bet but to decrease the uncertainty

which is what most people do, increases the

and thus increase the value of the bet.

perceived risk of the option, which in turn makes

The EG-EV curve and Samuelson’s example

the decision maker demand higher expected return

are closely related to various choice behaviors

(equity premium) to compensate for the high

<Figure 3> The EG-EV curve for Different Values of  (   , k=2)
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risk. As an illustration, Figure 4 shows three

the EV of an alternative. As the degree of loss

different probability distributions of perceived

aversion gets larger, the EV becomes smaller

gains generating the same expected value(EV).

(Figure 5).

The figure implies that the expected gain should
be correspondingly higher for an alternative with
higher uncertainty to provide the same EV. The
degree of loss aversion has a direct impact on

<Figure 4> The Three Distributions of  Generating the Same Expected Value of Zero (   , k=2)

<Figure 5> The EG-EV Curve with Varying Degrees of Loss Aversion (   )
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(6)

Ⅲ. The EV Function based on a
Value Function Incorporating
Decreasing Marginal Sensitivity

asymmetric logistic function (Figure 6).

if  ≥  , and
In the previous section a simple piecewiselinear value function is assumed to avoid computational complications in deriving the EV

if   

(7)

function. However, the linear approximation of
the prospect theory value function is justifiable

r is a positive coefficient, M is a constant

only when  is assumed to lie within a rela-

implying the upper limit of the value, and k

tively narrow range around zero. For more strict

the degree of loss aversion (r > 0, M > 0, k >

theoretical generalization, another important prop-

1). Values of r and M do not affect the theo-

erty of the prospect theory value function should

retical implication of the analysis. As a numer-

be incorporated in the analysis, the decreasing

ical example, we will simply assume that k=2,

marginal sensitivity. We can adopt a logistic


M=1 and r  
.



curve to incorporate this property. The original
logistic function is slightly modified to incorporate

If we assume that  follows a logistic prob-

the loss aversion effect as well and the modi-

ability distribution as in the previous section,

fied version can be distinguishably called the

the expected value can be similarly calculated

<Figure 6> The Prospect Theory Value Function Represented with an Asymmetric Logistic Function (k=2)
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as follows.

(9)
The existence of a positive threshold level as

E
  in Figure 2 is also evident in the case

of a logistic value function. The EV curves
can be drawn for different values of perceived
uncertainty (Figure 8) and for different degrees
(8)

of loss aversion (Figure 9). Figure 8 shows
that, as the prospect theory states, a more un-

For M=1, k=2,    , E  can be cal-

certain option is avoided in the gain region but

culated as follows and the EG-EV curve can

is preferred in the loss region. To be more ex-

be drawn as shown in Figure 7.

act, a small negative value of E  becomes
the fiducial point where the risk attitude is
reversed. The reversal of risk attitude around a
certain reference point, which is the core tenet
of the prospect theory, can be made explicit
with the EG-EV curve.

<Figure 7> The EG-EV Curve Based on a Asymmetric Logistic Value Function (k=2,    )
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<Figure 8> The EG-EV Curve for Different Values of   Based on an Asymmetric Logistic Value Function (k=2)

<Figure 9> The EG-EV Curve for Different Values of k Based on an Asymmetric Logistic Value Function (   )

The EG-ERV curve also implies that what

dramatically as people’s experiences with a new

has been referred to as ‘the pioneering advant-

brand accumulate. Thus, a pioneer brand is of-

age’ in marketing (Schmalensee 1982; Carpenter

ten preferred to late entrants with similar ex-

and Nakamoto 1989; Kerin et al. 1991; Urban

pected quality but of high uncertainty. Similarly,

et al. 1986) arises not from the higher expected

the sudden explosion of a new product’s sales

utility of the pioneer brand but from the high-

after a certain time interval can be attributed

er perceived uncertainty of the later entrants’

not to the change in expected utility but to the

quality. The perceived uncertainty will decrease

decrease in perceived utility variance (Bass 1969).
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As an additional analysis, another type of
value function is considered. In explaining the


  Q,

if  ≥  and



   kQ , if    and

(10)

concept of satisficing heuristic in human decision making, Simon (1955) proposed a discrete
value function with the concept of a certain
acceptance level and he referred to it as a

The expected value calculated with the assumption of logistically distributed  is as follows.

simple payoff function(p.61, Simon 1955). The
payoff is either satisfactory or unsatisfactory. To
maintain notational consistency throughout the
article,  will be used to denote the difference
between the payoff and the acceptance level.
The value of  being greater or equal to zero
refers to the condition where the payoff is sat-

(11)



isfactory while  being negative implies that
the payoff is unsatisfactory. The discrete value

If we assume a simple case where Q=1 and

function is represented by Equation (10) and
Figure 10. In Equation (10), Q is some positive

k=2 and    ,

and the

constant and k is degree of loss aversion as in
the previous examples (k > 1).

shape of E   can be represented as in Figure
11. Figure 11 implies that the EG-EV func-

<Figure 10> The Discrete Value Function Proposed by Simon (1955) (k=2, Q=1)
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tion based on the discrete value function has a

consider an option’s payoff falling short of the

shape similar to the one based on the prospect

acceptance level more seriously than its meet-

theory value function. Comparing Figure 7 and

ing the acceptance level, the expected payoff

Figure 11, we can conclude that Simon’s discrete

should be greater than the acceptance level in

value function and the prospect theory value

order for the option to be chose. The combina-

function have exactly the same implications as

tion of the expected value maximization and

to the decision making in the real world where

the type of discrete value function proposed by

perceived uncertainty is ubiquitous. If people

Simon can also explain the reversal of risk at-

<Figure 11> The EG-EV Curve Based on a Discrete Value Function (k=2, Q=1)

<Figure 12> The EG-EV Curve Based on a Discrete Value Function (k=2, Q=1)
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titude around a certain reference point. The

If it is assumed that there are only two alter-

only difference between the two types of val-

natives, i and j, in choice set A,  becomes

ues functions is that in the discrete value

option i’s gain or loss compared to option j.

function case, risk neutral behavior takes place

Likewise,  becomes that of j compared to i.



at E    . The EG-EV curves can function

Figure 13 shows the EG-EV curves for both

as a part what has been a theoretical missing

options i and j simultaneously, where the value

link between Simon’s satisficing theory and the

function is assumed as shown in Figure 6 (   ,

prospect theory.

k=2, and    ). Note that E    E  .
When E  has a value greater than E  ,

Ⅳ. The EG-EV Curves and
Choices from Similarly
Attractive Alternatives


E 
  will be positive. And if E  is smaller

than E  , E  will be positive. If |E  |
< E  , both E  and E   will have
negative values, implying that the EVs of the
similarly attractive options can all be negative.

When an alternative is evaluated, the other

The range of E  where neither of the given

alternatives in the same choice set are often

alternatives is deemed sufficiently better than

the most salient and easily available reference

the other to be adopted can be called the zone

points (Tversky and Kahneman, 1991; Hsee

of choice conflict. Because none of the two

and Leclerc, 1998; Anderson and Bower 1973).

similarly attractive alternatives is perceived as

<Figure 13> The EG-EV Curves of both i and j and the Zone of Conflict (   ,    ,    )
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providing sufficient benefit to be chosen, nei-

select the alternative that is superior on the more

ther of them is chosen, which is often called

important dimension, which seems to provide a

the adoption of no choice option(Tversky and

compelling reason for choice (Slovic, 1975; Tverksy

Shafir, 1992; Dhar, 1998). The analytical result

et al., 1988). If they fail to find the compelling

is consistent with the previous studies support-

reason for choice, they reject any of the pre-

ing the preference construction process that re-

sented alternatives. Even though an alternative

sults in small differences in attractiveness among

may seem unattractive when presented alone,

the alternatives increases the preference for

it can appear attractive when presented with a

and adoption of a no-choice option (Tversky and

less attractive one (Hsee and Leclerc, 1998;

Shafir, 1992; Dhar, 1998; Dhar and Simonson

Huber et al., 1982; Dhar, 1998; Tversky and

2003; Luce 1998). Not choosing any of the given

Kahneman 1991). Likewise, comparison with a

alternatives can be perceived as maintaining

more attractive alternative may lower the rela-

the status quo, he or she may perceive the value

tive value of an alternative. The result of the

of no-choice option as being zero. Therefore,

analysis further implies that comparison with an

the decision maker can reject any of the equally

equally or similarly attractive alternative (i.e.

or similarly attractive options and adopt a no-

alternatives with the same expected qualities)

choice option, if a no-choice option is available

can also make the focal alternative not attrac-

in the choice set. Previous studies support the

tive to adopt under uncertainty.

notion that loss aversion causes what is called

Increased uncertainty weakens the role of the

the status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser

expected gain of an alternative on choice and

1988; Kahneman et al. 1991).

increases the probability of rejecting all the

The existence of the conflict zone is the rea-

alternatives. Consumers with high level of per-

son why a large difference in attractiveness makes

ceived uncertainty are likely to find all the given

it easier to arrive at a decisive choice (Dhar

alternatives unattractive to choose due to the

1998). When people face a choice where no single

fear for potential losses. In such cases, what is

alternative has a dominant advantage, they can

in fact a good product cannot be recognized by

either avoid making a choice or purposefully

consumers and thus cannot be adopted by them.

manipulate their perceptions through some ‘mental

Akerlof(1970) argues that the information asym-

gymnastics’ to make the perceived expected gain

metry between buyers and sellers can cause

wide enough to justify their decision (Shafir et

market failure. This study provides a different

al., 1993; Simonson, 1989; Montgomery, 1989).

perspective to information-related market failure.

One of the heuristics they adopt to resolve the

Reducing perceived uncertainty by providing

conflict is the lexicographic rule whereby they

more information to consumers narrows the con-

Modeling the Relationship between Expected Gain and Expected Value 59

flict zone and thus benefits what is truly a better

based on the EV function provide implications

brand (cf. Hoch and Deighton, 1986). The in-

consistent with the results of the previous em-

creased consumer expertise or knowledge is likely

pirical and theoretical studies. In economics,

to reduce perceived variance of quality, thus

psychology and marketing literature, there are

ramify the effect of ‘true’ performance quality

a host of models that incorporate loss aversion

(Sen, 1998; Bhat, 1995). Providing more in-

(Tversky and Simonson 1993; Usher and

formation generally functions as reducing per-

McClelland 2004; Hardie, Johnson and Fader

ceived uncertainty and making decision making

1993; Kivetz, Netzer, and Srinivasan 2004;

easier.

Rooderkerk, Van Heerde, and Bijmolt 2011), but
few have been able to incorporate the effect of
loss aversion and uncertainty simultaneously.

Ⅴ. Conclusion

The current study has limitations. The prospect theory posits that not only the values of
the outcomes but also the corresponding proba-

The literature in behavioral economics re-

bilities are evaluated subjectively (Tversky and

vealed that the attractiveness of a stimulus op-

Kahneman 1992). For the sake of simplification

tion is determined subjectively and contextually

needed for theoretical analyses, this study rules

(Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Tversky and

out some of the complexities of choice and as-

Simonson 1993; Allais, 1953). The proposed EV

sumed that the expected value is evaluated with

function is as generalization of the traditional

exact actual probabilities as they are. In addition,

expected utility model incorporating a more flexible

assuming a specific form of probability dis-

and descriptive utility function to accommodate

tribution (logistic distribution) for the analyses

the notion of preference as a constructive, con-

can be a factor limiting the generalizability of

text-dependent process (Slovic, 1991; Tversky

the analytical results. However, this modest

and Thaler, 1990; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).

lack of realism leads to a significant degree of

Even though the concept of value proposed by

mathematical convenience, and seems to have

prospect theory is widely accepted as the just

little effect on the model’s qualitative proper-

substitute for the traditional concept of utility,

ties and its implications.

the concept of expected value has not gained

<Received September 5. 2016>

deserved attention as expected utility. It seems

<Accepted October 26. 2016>

that it is partly due to the difficulties in explicit
functional representation of the expected value.
The proposed EG-EV curve and the analyses
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